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Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which 
increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and 
those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such 
intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely 
elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain 
offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities of birds. When this research is approached with a 
species-specific focus, it appears likely that one familiar species, the chicken (Gallus gallus 
domesticus), also exhibits primitive self-consciousness. Given the likelihood that they are primitively 
self-consciousness, chickens warrant a degree of moral standing that falls short of that enjoyed by 
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Introduction 
Contemporary research into the structure of the avian brain has triggered a major 
shift in our understanding of avian cognition. For a century, scientists thought that 
the neocortex was a prerequisite for higher cognition. As the neocortex is found only 
in mammals, research into the cognitive abilities of other animals was considered 
pointless, as birds were assumed to lack the brain feature necessary for malleable, 
that is, non-instinctive, behaviour. In recent decades however it has emerged that 
functions performed by the neocortex in mammals are performed by different parts 
of the avian brain. This has caused the Avian Brain Nomenclature Consortium, an 
international group of neuroscientists, to overhaul the terminology that scientists 
used for 100 years to identify different parts of the avian brain (Avian Brain 
Nomenclature Consortium: 2005).  
According to the consortium, the new picture of the avian brain “sets the stage for 
a re-evaluation of the cognitive abilities of birds” (Avian Brain Nomenclature 
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Consortium 2005: 156). Just such a re-evaluation is now being undertaken by animal 
scientists in many different fields. One suggestion they increasingly make is that the 
new picture of avian cognition calls into question the popular notion that primates 
occupy a position of exceptional cognitive standing among animals. Such a view is 
expressed for example by Nathan Emery and Nicola Clayton, an animal behaviourist 
and experimental psychologist, respectively, at Cambridge University. “Why have 
primates achieved this special status when the evidence suggests that species of 
birds have cognitive abilities that are equal to or more sophisticated than have been 
demonstrated for primates?” (Emery and Clayton 2004: 36-7) A similar viewpoint is 
taken by Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan of the Centre for Neuroscience and 
Animal Behaviour at the University of New England. They note that recent animal 
cognition research “challenge[s] the concept that primates are special and even the 
view that the cognitive abilities of apes is more advanced than that of non-primate 
mammals and birds” (2004: vii). The same point is made in regard to chickens by 
Lucia Regolin, a psychologist at the University of Padua, and three co-authors. 
Regolin and her colleagues point out that domestic chicks have “striking abilities to 
maintain working memories of the location of biologically attractive objects that 
parallel or outperform those of most mammals, including primates” (Regolin et al. 
2005: 855)  
If animal scientists across disciplines have noted the significance of the new 
understanding of avian cognition, the same is not true of moral philosophers. 
Although it is common for moral theorists to ascribe different degrees of moral 
standing to entities with different degrees of cognitive ability, to my knowledge, no 
moral philosopher has noted of the revised view of avian cognition and inquired 
into its ramifications for our understanding of the moral standing of birds. This is 
surprising, given that recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of 
3 
 
theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate 
standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely 
conscious.1 Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such 
intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to 
more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. Given the revised 
view of avian cognition, it is worth asking whether any species of bird might also 
possess primitive self-consciousness and, if so, what degree of moral standing this 
entails. 
Executing this project requires bringing sophisticated moral concepts to bear on 
cutting-edge neuroscience. On a conceptual level, it requires noting just what 
primitive self-conscious amounts to, and why its adoption will mark an 
improvement for any moral theory that recognizes only two levels of standing. The 
version of primitive self-consciousness best deployed in this regard, I argue, is one 
that innovates on previous versions, suitably revised so as to include a primitive 
ability to conceive of oneself through time. When the new avian cognition research is 
approached with a species-specific focus, it appears likely that one familiar species, 
the chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus), exhibits this type of primitive self-
consciousness. I focus on the chicken because it is a bird whose cognitive abilities 
have been extensively re-examined in recent years, and whose moral standing is of 
more than passing interest: more chickens may be killed by humans than any other 
                                                
1 In addition to Bermudez’s notion of primitive self-consciousness, discussed below, Gary Varner also offers a 
systematic examination of a middle position between personhood and mere sentience, one which Varner labels 
that of near-personhood (Varner: forthcoming). Peter Singer endorses Varner’s notion in the third edition of 
Practical Ethics (2011:103). For a similar idea, see Michael Tooley’s notion of a quasi-person (1983: 424). Jeff 
McMahan mentions in passing the notion of an “intermediate status” between personhood and sentience, 
without exploring the notion (2002: 265). 
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land animal.2 Given the likelihood that they are primitively self-consciousness, 
chickens warrant a degree of moral standing that falls short of that enjoyed by 
persons, but which exceeds the minimal standing of merely conscious entities.  
Primitive Self-Consciousness 
Many moral theories divide entities with moral standing into two categories, 
persons and non-persons. Theories differ in how they distinguish persons from non-
persons, but roughly speaking, it is common for personhood to be extended to 
entities that are not merely conscious but self-conscious. Non-persons with moral 
standing, by contrast, are typically merely conscious, or sentient. To be sure, there 
are theories of animal ethics which deny that self-conscious entities warrant a greater 
degree of moral standing than merely sentient ones.3 But the counter-intuitive 
implications of such theories can be seen by considering their implications for 
lifeboat scenarios in which, all else being equal, we must chose between saving a 
normal adult human and a dog. On such approaches, the greater cognitive abilities 
of the human afford no reason to save her life over that of the animal. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the most influential theories of animal ethics do in fact ascribe 
higher moral status to self-conscious beings, which seems a reasonable distinction to 
draw (Singer 1990: 5-6, Regan 2004: 351).4  
                                                
2 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in 2009 over 8.6 billion chickens 
were killed in the United States to produce meat. By contrast, only 3.3 million cattle were killed for the same 
purpose (FAOSTAT 2011). The difference is explained in part by the fact that a typical chicken carcass 
provides six lbs. of meat, while a cow’s affords 1,200 lbs. 
3 Of such theories the most sophisticated is perhaps that of Sapontzis, who accepts the above mentioned 
implication regarding lifeboat scenarios (1987: 221).  
4 The fact that a deontologist such as Regan accepts that there can be situations in which it is acceptable to 
sacrifice a conscious entity to save a self-conscious one should remind us that such a view is not necessarily 
utilitarian. On Regan’s view for example it is acceptable to sacrifice less cognitively advanced beings for the 
sake of self-conscious ones in what he terms “prevention cases,” or those in which the only way to prevent some 
innocent being or beings to be harmed is to harm another (2004: 287). A utilitarian would accept sacrificing one 
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Yet there is an intermediate category occupied by entities that exhibit something 
in between full self-consciousness and mere consciousness, namely, primitive self-
consciousness. The concept of primitive self-consciousness has been outlined by José 
Luis Bermúdez. Below I will defend a version of primitive self-consciousness that 
differs in an important way from Bermudez’s version. It is helpful however to begin 
with an outline of Bermúdez’s account. I will call Bermúdez’s version of primitive 
self-consciousness the type-one version to distinguish it from my own, type-two, 
version. Bermúdez’s analysis involves not only primitive self-consciousness itself, 
which is a conceptual category, but a detailed empirical discussion of one type of 
entity, human infants, whom Bermúdez argues exhibit primitive self-consciousness. 
These two features are closely intertwined in Bermúdez’s discussion, and it will be 
helpful to take note of his empirical claims in order to illustrate what Bermúdez’s 
pioneering version of primitive self-consciousness involves. It bears stressing 
however that my discussion of Bermúdez’s empirical account is by way of 
illustration. My account is agnostic as to whether infants do in fact possess this trait. 
More important for my purposes is the category of primitive self-consciousness 
itself. This conceptual claims, unlike Bermúdez’s empirical ones, I endorse (in 
modified form).  
Type-one primitive self-consciousness has been put forward as involving three 
central features. Shaun Gallagher itemizes them in a summary that builds on 
Bermúdez’s account: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
being to save another of higher moral standing in a much wider range of contexts. My account does not offer a 
final account of how often and under what conditions such trade-offs will be permissible, and entails only that 
such trade-offs are permissible in prevention cases (lifeboat scenarios).  
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1. A body schema, defined as a subpersonal control mechanism that, in an 
immediate and close to automatic fashion, provides the capacity to control posture 
and movement. 5 
2. A differentiation between self and other.  
3. A recognition that the other is of the same sort as oneself (Gallagher 1996: 133-4) 
 
In order to better understand these three features, it is helpful to note their 
original use, which was to argue for a revised view of the cognitive abilities of 
newborns.  
A longstanding view in the child development field has held that infants under 8- 
12 months are not capable of so-called invisible imitation, or imitation of another 
individual’s movements using parts of the infant’s body that are invisible to it, such 
as its face. According to Piaget and other influential theorists, this was because the 
infant did not have a body schema, understood as a proprioceptive awareness of its 
own body. Proprioceptive awareness in this usage refers to an awareness of the 
location of one’s hand when it is behind one’s back or an awareness that one is 
smiling without looking in a mirror. 
Studies begun in the 1970s challenged the traditional view. They saw infants as 
young as one day old engage in imitative behaviours involving facial acts, such as 
mouth opening and tongue protrusion. An experimenter would perform the action 
while the infant had a dummy in its mouth. After the dummy was removed, the 
infant would repeat the modelled action. Given that this was impossible on the 
                                                
5 Body schema is sometimes distinguished from the more complex notion of body image. As Gallagher says of 
the latter, “body image, when fully developed, is a system of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about one’s own 
body. As such the body image involves a reflective intentionality in which one’s own body is the intentional 
object” (1996: 133). Bermúdez does not distinguish between body schema and primitive body image, but 
Gallagher persuasively argues that the former is all that primitive self-consciousness presupposes (1996: 133).  
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traditional understanding, the experiments seemed to show that very young infants 
had several attributes the traditional picture overlooked.6  
One was a body schema (Gallagher 1996: 133). This was because awareness of the 
gesture to be imitated and awareness of the imitating action occur in different 
sensory modalities ( Bermudez 1996: 389). A visual stimulus is followed by an action 
involving a part of the infant’s body, the face, which the infant cannot see, but is 
rather aware of due to its proprioceptive awareness. The ability to “perceive and act 
upon intermodal equivalences” in this way requires the existence of some sort of 
body schema, because such a schema is a basic prerequisite of the integration of 
perception and motor commands (Bermúdez 1996: 390). 
Bermúdez argues that the experiments also demonstrate that an infant is able to 
distinguish between itself and an other of the same sort as itself. His claim here has 
to do with the nature of imitation, which he takes to presuppose a rudimentary 
grasp of the self-other distinction. The infant, Bermúdez suggests, has to have at 
least a dim comprehension of the fact that the entity it observes is one whose action 
it can copy: 
 
Not only do these infants have to grasp the intermodal equivalence of, 
say, a perceived tongue protrusion and their own act of protruding their 
tongue, but they also have to grasp that the perceived tongue protrusions 
is the sort of thing that they can imitate, as opposed, for example, to the 
movement of a nipple, to which they respond by sucking rather than by 
trying to imitate it (1996: 390). 
 
 
When the infant sees a nipple, it responds by attaching itself to it. When it sees an 
experimenter sticking out her tongue, by contrast, it responds by sticking out its own 
tongue. This second type of reaction would appear to presuppose an awareness that 
the experimenter is doing something of which the infant itself is capable. Or as 
Bermúdez puts it, the infant’s level of awareness “seems to involve a grasp that the 
                                                
6 The experiments in question are Meltzoff and Moore 1977; Meltzoff and Moore 1983; Field et al. 1982.  
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experimenter is a being like themselves, in at least the sense that they are constructed 
in more or less the same way” (Bermúdez 1996: 390). If that is the case then the infant 
is aware, however dimly, that the experimenter and it are different entities with 
some sort of affinity. That would appear to demonstrate some minimal awareness of 
the self-other distinction, and an awareness that the other is somehow similar to 
itself.  
If these conditions hold, Bermúdez argues, then the infant has a crude form of 
self-consciousness. A body schema for example would appear to be a kind of self-
awareness, if only the awareness that one is an embodied or physical being. This is a 
primitive form of self-consciousness that the more sophisticated or full versions 
draw on, as a body schema informs our sense of what our possibilities for action are 
(Bermúdez 1996: 390). Similarly, the infant’s imitative response would suggests that 
it is aware of a similarity between two entities, one of which is itself. This awareness 
again may be quite rudimentary, but its content concerns the nature of the infant 
itself. In particular, it is aware of possessing at least one possibility for action 
compared to the entity it observes. In taking that entity’s actions as inspiration for its 
own, it thus appears to manifest some limited awareness of self.  
Before completing our exegesis of type-one primitive self-consciousness, it will be 
helpful to note the relationship between primitive self-consciousness and its more 
full-blown counterpart. Exactly how is the first form of self-consciousness a more 
primitive version of the latter? To answer this question we need to note two features 
of self-consciousness proper.  
The first is a capacity for reflexive self-reference, as when we refer to ourselves 
using the first-person pronoun. This capacity to single ourselves out in a reflexive 
way makes possible many of the high-level cognitive actions we associate with full 
self-consciousness. According to Bermúdez, they include the “capacity to make and 
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reflect upon plans for the future, to form second order desires, and to fit together 
autobiographical memories into the narrative of a single life” (1996: 391) Reflexive 
self-referencing has other components, but one important aspect is that it is a tool 
self-conscious subjects can use to distinguish themselves from other self-conscious 
subjects. Using the first person pronoun is a way of “delimiting oneself as the object 
being spoken or thought about,” as distinct from other self-conscious beings one 
might think or speak about (1996: 391). 
The second noteworthy feature of full self-consciousness is essential self-
knowledge, or knowledge of the sort of being that one is. In the case of adults, this 
might include the knowledge that one is an embodied human being, with powers of 
rationality, who is a member of a community with other such beings, etc. 
Bermúdez’s central claim is that infant imitation behaviour displays a primitive 
form of both of these features of full self consciousness. The understanding of the 
distinction between self and other that an infant displays in imitating an 
experimenter’s behaviour is an early form of the much more complex distinction 
between self and other that occurs in full self-consciousness through reflexive self-
reference. Similarly, the infant on Bermúdez’s account displays a rudimentary form 
of essential self-knowledge by grasping that it is a being like the experimenter. 
Another way to say this is that the infants manifest a certain degree of essential 
knowledge and employ it to govern their interactions with the experimenter. This 
was suggested by their awareness that the acts they see are ones they can perform. 
Such an awareness is a kind of self-knowledge. To be sure, it is a far less developed 
form of self-knowledge than the full-blown version, which is entirely conceptual and 
propositional, while the baby’s version is more akin to knowing-how than knowing-
that. Nevertheless, the two forms of self-knowledge are on the same developmental 
continuum. And so the baby’s self-knowledge stands in the same relation to an 
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adult’s as its crude grasp of the self-other distinction stands in relation to a more 
sophisticated version that is manifest through reflexive self-reference. 
To sum up our exegesis of Bermúdez, what is important on his analysis is not an 
infant’s capacity for imitation as imitation. Imitation rather bespeaks some minimal 
level of self-awareness.7 If we conceive of self-consciousness as a spectrum, with full 
self-consciousness at one end, and a much more minimal version at the other end, 
the infant seems conscious of itself enough to be just inside the boundary of the 
primitive level of self-consciousness. That is not very impressive when we have full 
self-consciousness in mind. But it is more than would be true of an entity that was 
conscious, with absolutely zero degree of self-consciousness, not enough even to 
know it could imitate what it was seeing. 
Now one possible objection to this interpretation of infant imitative behaviour is 
to say that what is happening is a reflex. On such a view, the infants are not 
exhibiting any degree of self awareness, but are rather exhibiting an “innate 
releasing mechanism,” or a pre-programmed response to perceived events 
exhibiting a common structure (Bermúdez 1996: 392). This view however is normally 
taken to apply to actions that occur without the involvement of memory: rather the 
stimulus arrives and is met with the pre-programmed action in question. In the case 
of the infant experiments, however, the infant has a dummy in its mouth when it 
sees the model behaviour and only later imitates it. This means there must be a 
stored representation of the model’s facial gesture that triggers the infant’s imitation, 
in a manner that seems distinct from how innate releasing mechanisms are usually 
understood. Bermúdez also notes that the infants in the experiments corrected their 
responses over time, and trial and error activity is normally thought not to be 
                                                




characteristic of reflexive behaviour. If so this provides an additional reason to reject 
the reflex interpretation. 
Derived Moral Significance 
This concludes our outline of type one primitive self-consciousness. As we will 
see, the version outlined below has an important difference with Bermudez’s 
account. But an important feature both accounts share is a common source of appeal. 
Both make appeal to the principle of derived moral significance, or the DMS 
principle for short. It takes the following form: 
 
If a particular feature or property is deemed to confer moral significance 
upon a life that has it, then any primitive form of that feature or property 
will also confer moral significance, although not to the same degree 
(Bermúdez 1996: 383). 
 
Such a principle entails that if a property or attribute is morally salient, then any 
entity which has a primitive form of that attribute also possesses a corresponding 
degree of moral significance. Applied to the property of self-consciousness, the DMS 
principle will entail that any entity that is primitively self-conscious is also possessed 
of a morally salient trait, albeit not to the same degree as an entity that exhibits full 
self-consciousness. The primitively self-conscious entity, importantly, possesses this 
morally significant trait independently of any other morally significant attributes it 
might possess (such as, for example, a capacity for suffering).  
In order to better understand the DMS principle, it will be helpful to note two 
claims it does not entail. It does not entail that an individual being which is currently 
conscious, and in the normal course of events will become self-conscious, possesses 
some additional degree of moral standing in virtue of its potential for self-
consciousness. An infant for example is conscious and in the normal course of events 
will become a person, and there have been moral theories which have sought to 
ascribe moral significance to this potential personhood. The DMS principle is not like 
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this: it makes no reference to potentiality. Rather it ascribes value to primitive self-
consciousness insofar as it is an existing feature of a living thing, and only insofar as 
it is an existing feature. The claim is that an account which makes the existence of a 
particular trait morally significant “ipso facto makes the existence of primitive forms 
of that feature morally significant” (Bermúdez 1996: 385). Potentiality of any kind 
never enters into the analysis. 
A second claim the DMS principle does not entail is that if an entity exhibits a 
primitive form of a morally significant property, then it will necessarily go on to 
possess that property in a fuller form. It is rather possible for the proportionate 
moral significance which the principle generates to apply to an entity that will never 
possess the full version of the attribute in question. We can imagine a human being 
who is cognitively disabled, such that his course of development does not follow the 
normal path leading to full self-consciousness. Instead he reaches the stage of 
primitive self-consciousness and stops there. The DMS principle would ascribe 
moral significance to this limited amount of self-consciousness, albeit, of course, less 
significance than that possessed by a fully self-conscious person. In a similar way, 
the DMS principle can also apply to a member of a species which does not have the 
capacity for full-self consciousness, but does exhibit a primitive form of self-
consciousness. 
Why adopt the DMS principle? One reason is because it avoids classifying 
sentient beings into one of only two categories of moral standing. As mentioned 
above, moral theories frequently divide entities with moral standing into persons 
and non-persons. Let us refer to such two-level theories with the shorthand term 
personhood theories. It is common for personhood theories to maintain that every 
sentient being below the level of a person has the same degree of intrinsic moral 
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standing (I say intrinsic in order to set aside moral issues having to do with personal 
relationships and social roles). 
Personhood theories do not seem able to capture the notion that there could be 
two sentient beings, neither of which was a person, but which nonetheless occupy 
different positions of moral worth. An ape and a fish, for example, may both fall 
short of personhood. But this fact, by itself, does not necessarily entail that they both 
must possess an equal degree of moral standing. It is at least possible that the ape, 
which may have cognitive abilities beyond that of the fish, deserves a heightened 
position of moral standing. Such a position may fall short of that of a person. 
Nevertheless it could still make a moral difference, such that if we had to choose 
between killing the ape or the fish, it would be less wrong to kill the fish. Given the 
diversity of living things, it seems an advantage of a theory of moral standing if it 
can at least admit such a possibility in principle, without presuming in advance that 
any particular animal does in fact occupy a position of worth below personhood but 
above that of a merely sentient creature. 
A theory that admits at least the possibility of an intermediate status between 
sentience and personhood will respect the DMS principle and be more nuanced and 
subtle than a theory that lacks any intermediate stage.8 Given the overwhelming 
diversity of animal life, and the fact that all theories of moral standing ascribe moral 
significance to the intrinsic properties of living things, it is reasonable to see a theory 
                                                
8 This nuance and subtlety however need not entail an extensive series of stages of moral value beyond the three 
argued for here (sentience, primitive self-consciousness and full self-consciousness). The presence of any degree 
of self-consciousness is metaphorically the difference between zero and one, a difference one can ascribe 
significance to, while stopping short of the claim that every additional degree of self-consciousness is equally 
significant. It is the presence of something not found at all in merely sentient creatures that makes primitive self-
consciousness a crucial threshold, in a way that does not necessarily carry over to creatures which possess a 
degree of self-consciousness in between the primitive and full levels. While one might argue for such a highly 




that is better able to reflect complexity in such properties as a better theory, all else 
being equal.  
Type-two Primitive Self-consciousness 
I turn now to outlining a notion of primitive self-consciousness that incorporates 
an important new element. Whereas Bermúdez focuses on the possession of a body 
schema, an ability to distinguish between self and other and an awareness that an 
other is similar to oneself, I employ a notion of primitive self-consciousness that 
additionally includes some minimal ability to conceive of oneself through time.  
Why adapt primitive self-consciousness this way? The ability to conceive of 
oneself through time is often cited as a morally relevant aspect of self-consciousness 
(Tooley, 1983, Singer 1993, Velleman 2000). The precise role this ability plays differs 
differ from one theory to another, but a common feature is its connection to the 
ability to form desires about the future. A person can form forward-looking desires, 
such that if the person is killed, it will prevent the attainment of those desires. Hence 
a person is deprived of something by death in a way that is not the case for an entity 
that is unable to form desires or expectations regarding its future.9  
It is possible to conceptually separate the ability to conceive of oneself through 
time from the aspects of self-consciousness discussed by Bermúdez. One might 
imagine for example a hypothetical creature that conceives of itself through time but 
is unable to distinguish between itself and another, as it has never encountered 
another sentient being. In regard to real entities, however, it seems unlikely that an 
animal will possess an ability to conceive of itself through time but completely lack 
                                                
9 This is not the same as saying that being harmed by death depends on forming desires about the future. An 
entity could be harmed in other ways, as by, for example, being deprived of its future good. There are theories 
that hold that the negation of forward-looking desires and expectations is but one way death harms us (i.e. 
McMahan 2003). But on such theories forward looking desires etc. still affect a beings moral status as they 
increase the scope of the harm caused by death. On such views, death may harm sentient entities, but it harms 
primitively self-conscious ones even more. 
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the aspects of primitive self-consciousness highlighted by Bermúdez. It seems rather 
in nature that cognitive ability is a “package deal,” in that an entity is more likely to 
have some primitive ability to form expectations regarding the future if it possesses 
the features of primitive self-consciousness highlighted by Bermúdez. 
If an ability to conceive of oneself through time and an ability to form desires 
regarding the future are morally salient aspects of full-self consciousness, then the 
principle of derived moral significance entails that a primitive ability to exercise such 
features will warrant an equivalent degree of moral significance. Applied to the 
ethics of killing, the ability of persons to form desires regarding the future is 
typically taken to warrant recognizing a presumptive right to life in their case 
(Tooley 1983; Singer 1993; Velleman 2000).10 The DMS principle suggests that if an 
entity is primitively self-conscious, it will not possess this same right. On the other 
hand, such an entity will have some interest in continued existence. It will be the 
kind of thing that can be harmed by death, in that it is deprived of something by 
being killed. I will try to outline below what moral entitlement best corresponds 
with this kind of primitive self-consciousness. The point at hand however is that a 
primitive ability to conceive of oneself though time is a morally salient attribute. 
With these considerations in mind, let us now ask: do chickens possess primitive 
self-consciousness? Our concern here is with primitive self-consciousness not as 
Bermúdez defined it, but the type-two version that includes a primitive ability to 
                                                
10 My usage of the term “right to life” is not meant to entail any commitment to deontology or anti-
consequentialism. It is rather a convenient shorthand for the degree of moral standing a person possesses, but 
which non-persons do not, when moral standing is determined without regard to the notion of time-relative 
interests. In this broad sense of the term, a right to life is something even a utilitarian can endorse, as it does not 
preclude killing one entity to achieve a greater good. Referring to a right to life is rather meant to express the 
general notion that killing a person requires greater justification than killing a non-person, in a manner that does 
not take a stand on precisely what that higher standard will involve, a subject on which different moral theories 
disagree, and which my account is not meant to settle. 
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conceive of oneself through time and form expectations regarding the future. An 
animal is more likely to possess this ability if the animal possesses the aspects 
contained in type-one primitive self-consciousness. Is it conceivable that chickens 
might not only meet Bermúdez criteria of primitive self-consciousness, but also have 
some sense of time and the future? 
It is relatively uncontroversial to ascribe greater cognitive abilities to chickens 
than to newborns. For example, the ability to retain recognition of partly hidden 
shapes, an ability possessed by two-day-old chicks, does not emerge in humans until 
4-7 months (Lea and Ryan 1996). Tests of two-day-old chicks’ abilities to recover 
fully occluded objects have also found that they mastered some aspects of stage four 
of the so-called Piaget Scale of object permanence, a level human infants do not 
begin to reach before three and half months of age (Regolin et. al. 1994, Regolin et. al. 
1995; Baillargeon and DeVos 1991).11 Such findings are perhaps unsurprising when 
one considers the environment chickens are born into. As avian cognition researcher 
Giorgio Vallortigara points out, “recognition of a partly occluded mother would be 
useful when an organism can move by itself to rejoin the mother and thus reinstate 
social contact; that is the case for the highly precocial young chick, but not for the 
highly altrical species such as the human newborn” (2004: 62). The findings just 
mentioned do not seem to presuppose the existence of any form of primitive self-
                                                
11 See Vallortigara 2004 61-2, 73-4, 80 for summaries of both experiments and the relative peformance of chicks 
and infants. Vallortigara also mentions a third study testing animals’ ability to distinguish between different 
corners of a rectangular cage using only geometric information about the cage’s layout. The animal was placed 
in the cage when food was located in a corner and made to disappear. After the animal was disoriented, it was 
allowed to search for the previously present food. More than one animal species was able to distinguish between 
different corners based only on the rectangular shape of the cage. According to Vallortigara, “the performance 
of birds in these tasks is identical to that of rhesus monkeys (and human adults) and clearly surpasses that of rats 
of human infants” (2004: 80).  
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consciousness. They should nonetheless open us to the possibility that, here as 
elsewhere, chickens may be more cognitively advanced than newborns. 
Is there any direct evidence for type-two primitive self-consciousness in chickens? 
Consider a recent study that investigated the behaviour of mother hens (Nicol and 
Pope 2005). The hens were exposed to two different food sources that had been 
treated with food colouring. One coloured food was edible while the other was not. 
The particular colours used varied from hen to hen, but for simplicity’s sake we can 
imagine a hen choosing between a plate of yellow food pellets, all of which were 
edible, and a plate of blue ones, all of which were inedible. The hens quickly learned 
to avoid the unpalatable food. They were later exposed to their chicks participating 
in a series of feeding sessions in a neighbouring pen. Each hen had an even number 
of chicks, some of which ate food sources with similar colour coding: a mother who 
had been exposed to yellow edible crumbs and inedible blue ones would watch 
some of her chicks choose between sources with the same colour coding. Each 
mother however was also exposed to a second set of offspring, whose food options 
had a reverse colour coding, with the yellow now unpalatable and the blue 
palatable. So far as the hens could tell, the second chicks were making a mistake and 
opting for unpalatable food. The researchers wanted to know if this information 
would have any influence on the hens’ behaviour. 
They found that it did. Hens are known to engage in maternal food displays, or 
actions which facilitate the acquisition of feeding skills on the part of their chicks. 
Such displays include food calls and pecking movements directed toward both food 
items and the ground. After witnessing the second set of chicks eat the “wrong” food 
the hens significantly increased their maternal food displays, engaging in more 
intense scratching and ground pecking than after witnessing the first group. The 
researchers concluded that hens modified their own behaviour in response to 
18 
 
perceived feeding errors by their chicks, seeking to instruct them in what type of 
food to avoid. 
The behaviour of the hens and chicks provides as much evidence for type-one 
primitive self consciousness in chickens as the child development studies cited by 
Bermúdez support a similar judgement regarding infants. Recall that Bermúdez 
noted that a primitive body image was suggested by an ability to integrate visual 
perception and motor commands. The chicks and hens both do this when they opt 
for food of one colour and not another. (The hens additionally accelerate their food 
displays in response to the visual stimulus of watching their chicks eat.) Insofar as 
primitive body image is present in an entity that can use its body in a manner 
sensitive to what it sees, chickens pass the test. 
The study also suggests that chickens meet Bermúdez’s second and third 
condition, that of being able to distinguish between self and other, and to recognize 
that one is an entity of similar kind to another individual. This was the conclusion 
Bermúdez drew from the infants’ ability to engage in imitative behaviour. Maternal 
food displays presuppose a similar ability on the part of both chicks and hens. The 
chicken researchers note that “newly hatched chicks peck at food and non-food 
items alike and have to learn which items are palatable and profitable” (2005: 768). 
Maternal food displays facilitate this type of learning, as the hen pecks at a palatable 
food item while vocalizing, or picks it up and drops it. In order for the chick to 
benefit from this type of behaviour it has to recognize that the hen is engaging in a 
behaviour, that of pecking at food, that it also can engage in. It has to be dimly aware 
that both it and the hen can eat the same thing. 
Similarly, in order for the hen to be concerned about the chicks’ perceived food 
error, she has to recognize an affinity between a chick’s action and what she was 
doing when she ate the unpalatable food. She has to have some minimal awareness 
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that the chick is doing what she did, which presupposes an awareness that the chick 
is the kind of thing that she is. 
Bermúdez argued that the involvement of memory and trial and error each cut 
against the judgement that the infants are acting on instinct. Both attributes are 
present in the chickens’ behaviour. Both the chicks and the hens are able to 
remember that food of a certain colour is unpalatable. After seven days of training, 
all subjects consistently avoided the unpalatable feed, a behaviour they maintained 
throughout the remaining four days of the experiment, during which less than one 
out of a thousand pecks were directed at unpalatable food. When the hens watched 
the chicks eat the “wrong” food and accelerated their display behaviour, they did so 
for one-hour periods. During the first half hour, the hens had no access to food of 
any kind, and had last eaten palatable food ninety minutes previously. In terms of 
the time since the hens had eaten unpalatable food, it had been at least 72 hours 
beforehand. When the hens intensified their displays in response to the chicks’ 
perceived mistake, therefore, they were acting on a stored representation rather than 
an innate releasing mechanism or instinct.  
The hens displayed no tendency to intensify their maternal displays in response 
to watching their chicks eat food of any particular colour. They rather changed their 
behaviour whenever they saw the chicks eat the food that was the same colour as 
their own unpalatable food, a colour which varied from hen to hen. It was not the 
colour per se that triggered their behaviour, in other words, but the memory that 
food of such colour was in their experience unpalatable.12 
                                                
12 The capacity of chickens to make decisions based on stored representations is well-supported by additional 
studies of chicken memory. Such studies have found that hens and chicks retain a memory not merely of the 
location but also the content of food caches (Forkman 2000, Cozzutti and Vallortigara 2001); that five-day-old 
chicks can determine the location of a moving object three minutes after it disappears, a result similar to that 
found in studies involving primates (Vallortigara et al. 1998); and that one-day-old chicks who observe another 
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As for trial and error, it too is presupposed by the chicken’s behaviour, as this is 
the context in which maternal food displays function. Baby chicks do not arrive in 
the world knowing what to eat. They learn where to direct their efforts by observing 
their mother’s behaviour. As such they engage in a form of rudimentary trial and 
error behaviour, up to the same level of an infant refining a tongue protrusion or 
similar facial gesture. In that sense there is just as much evidence cutting against a 
purely instinctive or reflexive explanation in the case of the animal as in the case of 
the infant.  
Chicks and chickens, just as much as infants, meet Bermúdez’s criteria of type-one 
primitive self-consciousness. Turning now to type-two self-consciousness, is there 
any evidence to suggest that chickens have a primitive sense of the future? Here we 
turn to a recent experiment that found chickens can display self-control when 
choosing between two time-released food sources (Abeyesinghe et al. 2005). The 
chickens were trained to peck on one of two keys that would temporarily release a 
quantity of food into a trough after a short delay. Pecking the first key would release 
the food after a two second delay, and it would stay in the trough for three seconds 
before disappearing through a drop-away floor. Pecking the second key, by contrast, 
would release the food after a six-second delay; but it would stay in the trough for 22 
seconds. The researched labeled the second choice the jackpot choice, as it allowed 
the chicken a much greater food access. 
The experiment was designed to test whether chickens had a capacity for self-
control, with self-control understood as the ability to “resist immediate gratification 
for a later benefit” (Abeyesinghe et al. 2005: 2). The study found that the chickens’ 
                                                                                                                                                  
chick have an adversive reaction after pecking a bead coated with a bitter chemical learn through observation 
that they should not peck the bead themselves, and avoid doing so up to 24 hours after the observation (Johnston 




tendency to exercise such self-control was “significant and pronounced” (2005: 10). 
Of the seven birds trained to choose between the two options, all seven opted for the 
jackpot choice over 75 percent of the time. Five of the seven did so over 95 percent of 
the time. 13 This overwhelming preference for the jackpot option suggests that the 
birds had some awareness of the short-term consequence of their decision regarding 
which key to push. As the researchers put it, “Our findings have demonstrated, first, 
that hens can discriminate between short time periods; second, that there is no 
absolute cognitive deficit preventing the hen from comprehending later 
consequences of food choices” (2005: 8). The experimenters do not claim to have 
shown precisely how far into the future hens can perceive: they note that little 
research has been conducted into this question to date. But the overwhelming 
preference of the birds for the jackpot food access over the impulsive option or 
random results does demonstrate an ability to see at least six seconds into the future. 
As the researchers put it, ”although how far into the future hens can mentally travel 
has yet to be determined, we now know that they are not completely ‘stuck in time’” 
(2005: 8, 10). 
Consider now a third and final study, which also investigated whether chickens 
have some perception of time (Taylor et al. 2002). It saw five chickens successfully 
trained to peck a lit touch screen to obtain a food reward. After the chickens learned 
how to use the screen, the researchers introduced a time delay into the experiment. 
After the screen came on, six minutes would elapse before any food could be 
obtained. The first peck of the screen after six minutes had elapsed would result in 
                                                
13 The researchers noted that different results obtained when the amount of time required for the jackpot choice 
changed. When the jackpot choice was changed to involve a 22-second delay to a 22-second food access, for 
example, six out of eight chickens opted for the two-second wait for a three second feed access over 95 percent 
of the time. The researchers suggest that the different results may be due to the birds discounting the value of a 
more temporally distant reward (2005: 6). 
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the food reward. The chickens were subjected to 150 training trials followed by 100 
testing trials. Previous studies in other species have found that some animals 
respond less at the beginning of the delay period and more frequently after it has 
elapsed. “The advantage of this behaviour is that the food reward is obtained 
reliably and the effort used in obtaining it is reduced, due to the low rate of response 
at the beginning of the interval. The frequent response near the end of the interval 
allows food to be obtained as soon as it becomes available” (Taylor et al. 2002: 42). 
The results of the chicken experiments found that they too pecked the screen 
comparatively less during the first two minutes of the time delay, and accelerated 
their pecking so that it peaked in frequency between six and 7.5 minutes. The 
researchers’ conclusions are tentative, among other reasons, because they were only 
able to perform a limited number of trials over a two-week period. Nevertheless, 
they take the results to raise the possibility that hens do have a limited perception of 
time. “The results indicate that domestic hens may have the ability to estimate the 
time to reward when given a reliable signal such as that given by the touch screen 
several minutes in advance” (2002: 49).  
This experiment and that previously involving self-control are similar to that 
involving maternal feed displays, in that the behaviours under investigation were 
learned through trial and error. In both time experiments, the chickens had to be 
trained to use an experimental device. The behaviours in both time experiments 
equally presupposed some stored representation of what the animals had learned: 
they had to retain some memory of how the equipment worked from their training, 
and apply that knowledge to their use of it in the experiments proper. These 
considerations cut against the notion that the birds’ activity in either experiment was 
purely instinctive. In the first experiment, the instinctive action would be to peck at 
either key with random frequency, with no sign of deliberation between the two. In 
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the second, an instinctive response would be less likely to vary across time. Rather 
the bird would again peck in an indiscriminate way. The time experiments thus 
seem to demonstrate behaviours that can no more be characterized in reflex or 
instinctive terms than the behaviour of the infants in the experiment Bermúdez 
discusses or that of the chickens in the maternal food display study. 
The time-perception studies suggest that chickens have a primitive aspect of the 
dimension of self-consciousness that involves a perception of oneself through time. 
Particularly in regard to the first time-study, the chickens were able to choose 
between two options that involved different rewards at different points in the future. 
As ever with primitive self-consciousness, the ability at hand is not very impressive 
when compared to its full-blown equivalent. But the perception of time in relation to 
their future is present nonetheless. This suggests that a reason that has sometimes 
been given for the permissibility of killing chickens, their lack of any awareness 
regarding the future whatsoever, may be based on a factually incorrect claim.  
The Benefit-of-the-Doubt Standard 
I say may be because our conclusions in this area would seem necessarily 
tentative. We are dealing with empirical findings that could potentially change. 
Nevertheless, I believe the above mentioned experiments show this much: it is 
reasonable to ascribe chickens whatever moral standing accompanies type-two 
primitive self-consciousness in a manner that gives them the benefit of the doubt.  
What justifies giving the birds such a benefit? The reason has to do with a danger 
that comes with determining which entities possess any morally salient attribute. 
The danger is one of causing harm by failing to recognize the attribute’s presence in 
a given entity. Investigating whether chickens possess primitive self-consciousness is 
not like investigating what colours their feathers are. When it comes to a morally 
irrelevant feature such as colour, we are not at risk of causing harm by employing an 
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overly strict method of classification. But when it comes to a morally salient feature 
such as primitive self-consciousness, if the birds possess it and we fail to recognize 
this through an overly scrupulous standard of proof, we could potentially do 
something morally wrong. For example, we might kill them in a wider range of 
contexts than their cognitive abilities and corresponding moral status permit when 
properly understood. The best way to avoid this danger is to err on the side of 
recognizing primitive self-consciousness.  
The legitimacy of a benefit-of-the-doubt standard would seem influenced by 
whether or not the evidence for the attribute under investigation is above some 
minimal threshold, a threshold that makes it at least possible that the attribute is 
present. For example, suppose an environmental ethicist were to argue that we 
should treat plants as persons. Imagine the environmentalist urged this view on us 
because it was at least open to doubt, and we should give plants the benefit of the 
doubt. Surely this would be a weak argument, given that there is no evidence that 
plants exhibit personhood.  
When it comes to type-two primitive self-consciousness, by contrast, there is 
enough evidence to make its presence in chickens an open question. That should 
cause us to make claims about the species’ moral standing in a manner that errs on 
the side of higher, rather than lower, moral ranking. This is not because we want to 
commit ourselves to unsupported views regarding animal cognition. It is rather 
based on a recognition of the difficulty of knowing what goes on inside the mind of 
creatures we cannot speak to directly. In the case of infants, for example, it seems 
reasonable to err on the side of extending them the protection of morality based on 
what we do know about them. The same interpretive stance should apply in our 
dealings with animals which, if anything, appear to have cognitive abilities beyond 
that of newborns.  
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The Moral Significance of Type-two Primitive Self-Consciousness  
If chickens do posses type-two primitive self-consciousness, what moral 
significance follows from this? One’s answer to this question will inevitably be 
influenced by one’s ethical theory. Most moral theories one encounters today 
however give some weight to the equal consideration of interests.14 As Peter Singer 
summarizes a simple version of this view, it entails that “the interests of every being 
affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the 
like interests of any other being” (Singer 1990: 5). Equal consideration need not 
apply at the level of judging individual actions: one could also employ it to 
determine what type of rule to adopt. Similarly, a commitment to equal 
consideration can be found in deontological and utilitarian theories alike.15 While 
there is ongoing debate as to what equal consideration precisely entails, the basic 
notion of equal consideration is widely endorsed. It is therefore worth asking what 
difference type-two primitive self-consciousness makes when combined with some 
version of the equal consideration of interests principle.  
It is often held that entities that are merely sentient are not harmed by death.16 
They have no welfare interest in continued existence, and so are not deprived of 
                                                
14 Many philosophers have noted the presence of some form of equal consideration across a wide variety of 
otherwise different theories of ethics and political morality. They include Singer (1990: 6), Hare (1972: 167), 
Nagel (1979: 111), and Dworkin (1983: 24). 
15 As Will Kymlicka remarks, “both [deontological theories and utilitarianism] work from a basic moral 
commitment to the idea of impartiality. Both theories accept that, from the moral point of view, each person is 
equally worthy of moral consideration, each person is an end in herself, whose interests must be given equal 
consideration” (1991: 159).  
16 The widespread view that chickens are not harmed by death is my target in this paragraph. But note that my 
discussion of primitive self-consciousness in chickens will also affect their standing in ethical theories, such as 
McMahan’s, which hold that merely sentient beings can be harmed by death. The presence of primitive self-
consciousness will increase the scope of the harm caused by death, and so make killing it that much worse than 
killing a merely sentient being. 
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anything when they are killed, so long as it is done painlessly. The same however is 
not true of entities that possess type-two primitive self-consciousness, who do have 
at least some interest in continued existence. Although that interest is not on the 
scale of that possessed by persons, it is nonetheless significant, as it means that a 
primitively self-conscious entities has interests that need to be taken into account 
when we are deciding whether or not to kill it. In order for killing them to be 
justified, some morally significant greater interest needs to be advanced by their 
death. This means that while chickens can be killed for wide variety of reasons than 
persons, there are some instances in which it is wrong to kill them, even when they 
die painlessly.  
How might we characterize such a level of moral standing? I believe it is best 
formulated in terms of what can be termed a “slow-to-kill” entitlement. Such a 
degree of standing is one that would permit killing a primitively-self conscious 
entity in a wider range of contexts than a person. If killing a bird was the only way to 
save a human life, for example, the slow-to-kill stance would license killing the bird. 
A person has greater cognitive abilities, including a greater ability to form 
expectations regarding the future. When comparing a life for a life, the person will 
lose more extensive welfare-interests when it is killed than will a primitively self-
conscious entity. The person’s interest in continued existence will outweigh the 
interest of the merely primitively self-conscious animal in its future. We can 
therefore legitimately say that in killing advances greater moral interest, with 
relative ranking determined according to the equal consideration standard. 
By the same standard, however, the most common reason for killing chickens—so 
we can eat them—does not measure up. The animal loses its life when it does not 
really need to. For we could live without chicken in our diets. For this reason, there 
is not a real need at stake. Rather a moral wrong occurs when we kill a primitively 
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self-conscious entity for such a purpose. The advertising that directs us to eat 
chickens because they are finger licking good, for example, would seem to reflect a 
morally trivial reason to kill them. That we enjoy how something tastes is not 
sufficient grounds to override its interest in continued existence. Indeed the mere 
fact that we take pleasure in eating an animals does not warrant any moral 
significance whatsoever. 
This conclusion can be supported by way of a thought experiment designed to 
illuminate an often overlooked feature of equal consideration.17 Imagine an affluent 
society in which everyone has an equal share of resources. Within this egalitarian 
society there is a city block where everyone has a house and a lawn. All but one of 
the people living on the block plant a garden. They then turn around and demand 
that the last person’s lawn be kept open for collective use as a park, even though the 
last block resident wants to plant her own garden. 
There are moral theories which would endorse taking the last person’s lawn. 
Preference utilitarianism, for example, takes equal consideration to involve the 
aggregation of pre-existing preferences. The homeowners who want to turn the lawn 
into a park outnumber the owner, so their action is just as it satisfies more 
preferences. Will Kymlicka however argues that what the homeowners do is wrong, 
on the ground that a concern for equality should enter into the very formation of our 
preferences. “Part of what it means to show equal consideration for others is taking 
into account what rightfully belongs to them in deciding on one’s goals in life. Hence 
prejudiced and selfish prejudices are excluded from the start, for they already reflect 
a failure to show equal consideration” (1990: 42).  
Kymlicka’s understanding of equal consideration is intuitively plausible. But if we 
accept Kymlicka’s restriction against selfish and biased preferences, then the desire 
                                                
17 The thought experiment is taken from Kymlicka (1990: 42). 
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to eat an animal that is harmed by death will not be granted any moral weight.18 This 
is because the preference to eat such an animal is one that does not take account of 
the bird’s interest in continued existence. This interest is entailed by its ability to 
form expectations regarding the future and a conception of itself through time, both  
of which are destroyed when it is killed. Given that the bird suffers a greater 
deprivation when it is killed than a person does when she must eat an alternative 
food source, especially an alternative source that is easily available, a preference that 
takes equal consideration into account at the level of its formation will be one that 
does not destroy the animal’s interest for a purpose as trivial as eating it for reasons 
other than sheer necessity. Much like the homeowners preference for a better vista at 
the expense of their neighbour’s welfare, the preference to eat an entity that is 
harmed by death can be said to exhibit a selfish disregard for the interest of the 
consumed animal, a refusal to recognize what is rightfully its. There is thus no 
interest to weigh against the animal’s interest in continued existence, as the interest 
in satisfying the desire to eat such an animal is never recognized as a morally 
legitimate interest to begin with.19 
Conclusion 
                                                
18 While I am here operating in an explicitly anti-utilitarian framework, I believe the avian cognition research I 
have cited will also have similar ramifications for some versions of utilitarianism. While the remark by Singer 
about equal consideration quoted above is not one which presumes the truth of utilitarianism, elsewhere in his 
writings Singer has adopted a consciously utilitarian framework. In this mode he argued that we have a 
substantial obligation to avoid killing entities which are capable of “conceiving themselves as distinct beings 
with a past and a future” (1993: 131). If I read Singer’s correctly, to the degree that an entity possesses this 
ability at all, even to a degree that falls short of that of a normal adult human, then “the case against killing [it] is 
strong” (1993: 132). By that standard, when the new avian cognition research is analyzed in Singer’s terms, the 
case against killing chickens is strong.   
19 I have been concerned with the ethics of killing a chicken merely to satisfy a culinary preference for meat. But 
if we would otherwise starve to death, the slow-to-kill principle would offer a more permissive judgement, 
whether or not we adopted Kymlicka’s view of equal consideration, on the grounds that a fully self-conscious 
entity suffers a greater loss through death than a primitively self-conscious one. 
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The new understanding of avian cognition means that claims that chickens are 
trapped in an eternal present can no longer be taken for granted. Such claims now 
require empirical evidence. Even if some of the new research is disproven, it should 
cause us to recognize the standard of proof that must be met in the debate over the 
killing of animals. Approaches that do not appeal to up to date research in animal 
cognition are no longer adequate.  
My reading of the empirical literature on avian cognition is that chickens can 
reasonably be said to possess the moral standing that accompanies type-two self-
consciousness, when such moral standing is assigned in a manner that gives the bird 
the benefit of the doubt. And I have argued that the moral entitlement which best 
corresponds to this attribute is neither a right to life nor a kill-with-indifference 
stance, but a slow-to-kill stance. An upshot of this claim is that the most widespread 
form of meat eating in our society is indefensible. In a world in which billions of 
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